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Resumen
La valoración de la inversión en compañías nacientes de alto crecimiento no es 
tarea fácil, pues los ingresos esperados se generan en un futuro lejano y bajo gran 
incertidumbre. De acuerdo con métodos tradicionales de valoración como el Valor 
Presente Neto, el mercado parece sobrevalorar algunas de estas compañías. Ello se 
debe a que estos métodos tradicionales no tienen en cuenta tres elementos esenciales 
que determinan el valor en estos casos: el capital intelectual como el motor de la 
innovación, el poder de mercado por la expectativa de ingresos monopolísticos si 
se da la innovación y una opción real de crecimiento que puede ser ejercida en caso 
de éxito. 
Este artículo aplica a una empresa de biotecnología el enfoque de opciones reales 
y destrucción creativa (Maya, 2004), el cual incluye estos tres determinantes del 
valor y logra explicar el alto precio que los inversionistas pagan por una acción de 
este tipo de empresas. Se demuestra que éste no es un caso de sobrevaloración sino 
de reconocimiento del alto potencial de crecimiento de empresas que se encuentran 
en sectores altamente innovativos.
Abstract
The value of investments in high growth start-up firms is difficult to assess because 
payments are far in the future and their arrival is uncertain. Some of these firms 
may seem overvalued according to traditional methods, such as the Net Present 
Value, which fails to account for three drivers of value for highly innovative 
industries: intellectual capital as the engine of innovation, market power as the 
expectation of monopolistic power when innovating, and a growth option which 
may be exercised in the case of success. 
1 Docente e investigadora del departamento de Finanzas, Escuela de Administración, Universidad EAFIT. 
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This paper presents a case study on a biotechnology start-up and applies the Creative 
Destruction – Real Options approach (CD-ROA) (Maya, 2004) which takes into 
account all three drivers of value and is able to explain the high prices investors pay 
for shares of a company in this industry. It proves that such prices are not cases of 
overpricing but of recognition of the large growth potential of firms which are part 
of highly innovative industries.
Palabras claves: Valoración, opciones reales, biotecnología, destrucción creativa, procesos estocásticos 
de salto.
Keywords: Valuation, Real Options, Biotechnology, Creative Destruction, Jump-only Stochastic 
Process.
“Deals have started trading on 
best-case scenarios”.
Fitzsimmons (Prudential Securities) after 
Gilead Sciences Initial Public Offering 
in 19922.
More than ten years after the comment above 
and motivated by a rally on Biotechnology 
market prices, Morgan Stanley advised its 
clients to invest in “high-quality, later-stage 
biotech names with top and/or bottom line 
growth” (WSJ, 2003). In general, the valuation 
of these companies appears to be overpriced in 
terms of traditional methods such as discounted 
cash flows. They require large investments in 
R&D, depend on the success of clinical trials 
and on Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
decisions, and only a few of them show profits. 
Additionally, when these companies become 
public, their products are in early stages of 
development. Consequently, there is much 
uncertainty regarding their value. 
Although the Biotechnology industry is more 
than twenty five years old –not an infant 
industry anymore-, the prices of companies in 
this industry still present high volatility3. This 
is evidence that investors´  attitudes towards 
biotech firms have fluctuated over the years, 
and not necessarily depending on general 
market behavior. 
The distribution of returns on the Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO)4 of two hundred biotechnology 
firms covering the period 1980-2003 exhibits 
a median of 6.61%, a mean return of 15.85% 
and is highly skewed to the right. Figure 1 
shows the histogram of these returns. This is a 
representative sample of the industry in terms 
of the period it covers and the number of firms 
included5, meaning it comprises periods of time 
when the stock market was booming and in 
recession, and when the stock market for this 
particular industry was alternatively bearish 
and bullish. Furthermore, it is not just a case of 
success at the stage of their IPO since returns 
on the Nasdaq Biotechnology Index (NBI) from 
January, 1995 to August, 2006, were  almost 
twice the returns of the S&P500 for the same 
period6. 
How could some apparently high valuations in 
the Biotech industry be explained? Generally, 
the valuation of investments in start-up firms 
2 Investment Dealer’s Digest (1992).
3 Average annual volatility of returns on the Nasdaq 
Biotechnology Index (NBI) from January, 1995 to August, 
2006 is 37.5%.
4 These returns are computed as the percentage change in 
the closing price over the offer price of the IPO. The sources 
of information on the offering price are Lexis-Nexis News 
and http://www.BioSpace.com (June 4th, 2003) For the 
closing price the source is http://finance.yahoo.com (June 
18, 2003).
5 The biotechnology industry was born at the end of the 
seventies and this sample includes more than 41% of the 
public firms in the industry by June 30, 2003.
6 Annualized average daily returns on the NBI for this period 
were approximately 24% versus 13% on the S&P500.
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in high growth businesses is difficult to assess 
because payments are far in the future and 
their arrival is uncertain. Some of these firms 
may seem overvalued according to traditional 
methods such as the Net Present Value, which 
fails to account for three drivers of value for 
highly innovative industries: intellectual capital 
as the engine of innovation, market power as 
the expectation of monopolistic power when 
innovating, and a growth option which may be 
exercised in the case of success. 
The Creative Destruction – Real Options 
approach (CD-ROA) (Maya, 2004) takes into 
account all three drivers of value and is able 
to explain the high prices investors pay for 
shares of one of these firms. It proves that these 
prices are not a case of overpricing but rather 
of recognition of the large growth potential 
of firms which are part of highly innovative 
industries. Clearly, the biotechnology industry 
is one of such industries. This paper performs 
a Case Study applying the CD-ROA to a real 
biotechnology firm, Gilead Sciences Inc. For 
this purpose, I will begin by discussing the 
Figure 1
characteristics of the industry, the technology, 
and the product, which allow me to use this 
approach on this particular case.
1. Biotechnology and antisense 
technology for drug discovery
The Biotechnology Industry Organiza-
tion -henceforth BIO- defines biotechnology as 
“the use of the cellular and molecular processes 
to solve problems or make products. Included 
in this definition of the industry are the firms 
that use cells and biological molecules for appli-
cations in medicine, agriculture, and environ-
mental management” (BIO, 2000). 
This industry has become the focus of attention 
of politicians as well as investors because there 
are many expectations about its potential to 
improve the quality of life, increase agricultural 
productivity, and generate a safer environment. 
Also, from an economic point of view, it gets 
great attention due to its fast growth –the 
industry has more than quadrupled in revenues 
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7 http://www.bio.org/er/statistics.asp (August 31st, 2006).
8 The antisense drug is a “synthetic strand of genetic material 
which replicates the second strand of the DNA double 
helix, called the antisense strand. It sticks to the mRNA 
like Velcro, and blocks the production of proteins. It is this 
process, much more precise and foolproof than the tentative 
way in which most current drugs cling to bad proteins, that 
hints at so much promise for these synthetic strands, which 
are known as antisense oligonucleotides, or oligos for short”. 
“Antisense: A Drug Revolution in the Making”, Business 
Week, March 5th, 1990.
and increased almost seven times in market 
capitalization since 19947.
The larger group of biotech firms is focused on 
therapies for human diseases. Particularly, the 
deciphering of the human genetic code has 
pushed fast development of genetic drugs. There 
are two main categories of therapies based on 
this kind of drug: gene therapy which involves 
inserting new genes into cells to produce 
therapeutic proteins in the body and nucleic 
acid-based therapy or code blocking which 
switches off genes so that they stop making 
harmful proteins. 
There are three principal strategies in the 
development of products for nucleic acid-based 
therapeutics: Antisense, Triplex, and Ribozyme 
technologies. Appendix A, Exhibit A1 gives a 
description of each one, its major therapeutic 
targets, and the name of the companies 
competing in each technological race. Of 
these three technologies, this paper focuses on 
the oldest one, the antisense technology, and 
the competition that takes place among the 
antisense firms to develop new drugs against 
HIV/AIDS8.
In 1980 AntiVirals Inc., now AVI BioPharma 
Inc., became the first antisense firm, but it was 
not until 1986, after Dr. Zamecnik published 
a paper showing that the antisense strand 
could interfere in the life cycle of the AIDS 
virus, when research on this technology really 
took off. Principally four companies started to 
compete on the development of antisense drugs 
against viruses, having HIV/AIDS as their 
natural target. Gilead Sciences Inc. in 1987, Isis 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. in 1989, and Hybridon 
Inc. in 1990, joined AVI BioPharma Inc. in a 
technological race to discover the first antisense 
compound to fight HIV/AIDS.
HIV/AIDS captured the attention of the 
antisense companies because at the end of 
the eighties it had become a major worldwide 
epidemic9. AIDS is caused by the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). By killing or 
damaging cells of the body’s immune system, 
HIV progressively destroys the body’s ability to 
fight infections and certain cancers. Since the 
epidemic began, more than sixty million people 
have been infected by the virus. HIV/AIDS is 
now by far the leading cause of death in sub-
Saharan Africa, and the fourth biggest global 
killer. In 2001, the epidemic claimed about 
three million lives10.
With the aim of fighting HIV/AIDS, a group 
of scientists founded Gilead Sciences, Inc. in 
1987. This company, located in Foster City, 
California, has focused its research on the 
development of antisense compounds against 
viruses, specifically HIV. Exhibit 2 shows the 
market price of its stock from the time of its 
inception up to its IPO. The last value of $214.5 
million is calculated based on the offer price 
for the IPO. The actual price achieved by the 
company was $289.6 million, after a successful 
public offer which made an investment banker 
exclaim that “Deals have started trading on 
best-case scenarios”. In what follows I apply the 
Creative Destruction-Real Options Approach 
(CD-ROA) (Maya, 2004) to explain why 
investors paid 35% more than the offer price for 
Gilead Sciences when it went public in January 
22, 1992.
9 The first case of AIDS was reported in the U.S. in 1981.
10 Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002 
http://www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/report_july02/
english/contents.html (June 16, 2003)
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2. The valuation of Gilead Sciences Inc. 
based on the CD-ROA
Valuing Gilead Sciences on the basis of 
its passive NPV is inadequate. Such valuation 
does not account for the fact that this company 
is subject to a creative destruction process and 
for the real options it available to it, specifically 
a growth option which can be exercised if it 
succeeds in innovating. An approach like the 
CD-ROA can estimate the value of this firm in 
a more accurately way as is discussed in what 
follows.
 
Gilead Sciences (henceforth Gilead) is subject 
to a creative destruction process described 
by Schumpeter (1942) since it is in a patent 
race against Isis Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Isis), 
AVI BioPharma Inc. (AVI BioPharma), and 
Hybridon Inc. (Hybridon) to develop the first 
antisense drug against HIV/AIDS, in a way that 
the first innovating firm becomes a monopolist 
in the market. Immediately after that, another 
patent race starts where the next innovating 
firm takes the previous monopolist’s market 
power away.  Permanently, some value is created 
but, at the same time, some is destroyed.
This patent race is “memoryless” as coined 
by Tirole (1988), meaning that all the firms 
in the market start from the same point. Past 
R&D experience or expenses do not affect 
the result, only the current R&D expense is 
a determinant of the probability of success in 
innovation. The CD-ROA assumes a single 
expected innovation, a drug against HIV/AIDS 
in this case, produced by means of a single R&D 
technology, the antisense technology, by a profit 
maximizing firm. The cost function is assumed 
to be the same for all the firms involved in the 
patent race. 
Another assumption of the CD-ROA is that 
innovation is always “drastic” in the sense 
that the product developed by the expected 
monopolist guarantees absolute market power 
to the innovating firm. The discovery of 
an antisense drug for HIV/AIDS would be 
considered a drastic innovation since this 
technology is much more precise than most 
current drugs in the way they cling to bad 
proteins. As a result, it would not produce the 
unwanted side effects characteristic of current 
drugs.
In addition to the expectation of an exclusive 
market power that emerges in a creative 
destruction process, the CD-ROA accounts 
for another factor, a growth option, which 
also adds value to the firm. This option may 
be exercised in the case of innovation if the 
change in the firm’s value is larger than the 
additional investments required for these 
purpose. The underlying asset to this option 
- S - is the current value of Gilead’s research 
project without flexibility. This value follows a 
jump-only stochastic process since market risk 
is ruled out by the expectation of an exclusive 
market power, thus the only uncertainty this 
firm faces is the technological risk of innovating 
first or being defeated in the race.
Due to this technological risk, the underlying 
asset is subject to two independent sources 
of jumps. One occurs when the expected 
monopolist introduces a “drastic innovation” 
causing a proportional change in the asset’s 
value equal to  = (J – 1)S, meaning that 
when S jumps, its value changes to SJ. The 
other jump occurs when the challenger firm 
wins the race by innovating first or produces 
a “drastic innovation” which puts an end to 
the previous firm’s monopolistic power. In this 
last case, the underlying asset’s value will jump 
to a scrap value, SY, since once the firm is 
forced out of the market, the only alternative 
is selling its assets for their scrap value. Hence, 
the proportional change in the asset’s value 
is = S (Y-1). Immediately after that, it may 
participate in a new technological race which 
starts immediately after the challenger firm 
innovates.
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Based on the above, S follows a jump-only 
stochastic process:
dS =  (J - 1)S dq + (Y – 1)S dπ (1) 
therefore, 
d ln S  =  (ln J) dq + (ln Y) dπ  (2)
where
J :  jump size in the case of innovation by the 
expected monopolist; ln  J ~  (, );
Y :  constant percentage of scrap value when 
the challenger innovates;
dq:  a Poisson process, which is equal to 
one with probability m and zero with 
probability (1 - m). m is the intensity of 
the Poisson process (expected number of 
drastic innovations); mdt is the probability 
of innovation by the expected monopolist 
per unit time.
dπ:  another Poisson process which is equal 
to one with probability c and zero with 
probability (1 - c). cdt is the probability, 
per unit time, of the challenger firm 
innovating. 
Both, m and c, depend on the corresponding 
firm’s level of investment in R&D -as a 
proportion of the total amount of investment 
required to producing and marketing the 
product- in the following way:
i = (R&Di ) = (R&Di )bi bi < 1 and constant 
meaning that the expected number of “drastic 
innovations” each firm can introduce in the 
market is a concave function of R&D, therefore, 
the probability of innovation increases by less as 
larger R&D investments are put in place. Firm 
i expends R&Di  dt between time t and t + dt. 
bi  is a parameter that measures the efficiency 
of such investment. 
If the value of S after innovating is greater 
than the value of the investment required to 
produce and market the product, the firm will 
exercise its growth option, G. By doing so, it 
exploits the exclusive market power guaranteed 
by its monopolistic position. The amount of 
investment necessary to exercise the option is 
the exercise price, X. The value of G at t = 
0 is equal to the present value of its expected 
payoff:
G
0
 = e¯ rt E
0
 [Max(St (m, c) –X,0] (3)
In a creative destruction process, the jump risk 
is non-systematic since it depends only on the 
technological uncertainty that surrounds the 
project and it affects the firms subject to this 
process exclusively. Being that the case, this 
risk may be diversified away (and therefore 
should not be priced by the market) by means 
of conforming a well-diversified portfolio 
which includes this project along with other 
assets (Ross, 1976). On the other hand, there 
is no market risk either since the firm has 
absolute market power, as explained above. In 
consequence, the appropriate discount rate for 
the option’s expected payoffs is the risk-free 
rate, r. 
If there is no innovation, the innovation is not 
drastic, or another firm wins the technological 
race, this firm may abandon the project and 
move on to a new project, a new patent race. 
The value of the firm, V, will be the sum of the 
project’s value without flexibility represented 
by S(t=0)  plus the value of the growth option 
G(t=0):
V(t=0) = S(t=0) + G(t=0) (4)
Assessing CD-ROA Parameter Values for 
the Case of Gilead Sciences:
For S, the underlying asset price, I take the 
offer price for Gilead’s IPO since it is set by 
an investment banker based on the valuation 
performed on the firm, which I assume was 
done, at that time, using traditional valuation 
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methods which do not account for flexibility. 
The offer price was $15, thus the value of the 
company at that price, including the new shares 
issued in the IPO, was $214.500.00011. However, 
the offer price usually includes a discount to 
attract investors which is typically 10%12, thus 
the value of Gilead would have been $235.95 
million.
X, the exercise price for the growth option, is 
the amount of additional investment in plant, 
equipment, and working capital necessary to 
produce the new drug. There is no information 
about an estimation of this amount for the 
industry. I found some evidence, however, from 
the same firm under study and from Agouron 
Pharmaceuticals, another biotechnology firm 
which was studied by Kellogg, Charnes, Demirer 
(2002). 
In the case of Gilead Sciences, the production 
of Viread, its successful drug against HIV/
AIDS, required an additional investment of 
27% of the increase in revenues from 2001-
2002 (See Appendix A, Exhibit A3.2: Gilead 
Sciences Balance Sheet and Exhibit A4.2: 
Consolidated Statement of Operations data). 
A similar percentage, 22%, was required by 
Agouron Pharmaceuticals when it started 
producing Viracept, the previously successful 
drug for HIV/AIDS. In the period 1997-1998, 
Agouron’s total revenue increased by $335 
million requiring $74 million in additional 
investment. (See Appendix A, Exhibits A5.1 
and A5.2 for Agouron Balance Sheet and 
Consolidated Statement of Operations data). 
Based on the this evidence, an estimate for X 
of 25% of the expected additional revenues will 
11 Appendix A, Exhibit A2 shows the number of shares issued 
by Gilead Sciences and the firm’s value from its inception up 
to its IPO.
12 Ivo Welch, a Finance Professor who has studied IPOs 
extensively, notes that the typical underpricing -the return 
from the offer price to the price when the market starts 
trading - is about 10%. http://www.iporesources.org/lebaron.
html (Sept. 4th, 2003).
be used in this case. Kellogg, Charnes, Demirer 
(2002) cites data from Myers and Howe (1997) 
on expected revenues from new drugs as shown 
in the next table:
Table 1
Expected Revenues from New Drugs
 
Peak Annual 
Revenue
Probability
BREAKTHROUGH 1,323,920 10%
ABOVE AVGE 661,960 10%
AVGE 66,200 60%
BELOW AVGE 7,440 10%
DOG 6,620 10%
E [ REVENUE ] 239,714
Myers and Howe (1997)
A drastic innovation corresponds to a 
breakthrough drug. Exhibit A6 shows the 
expected revenue generated by the sales of a 
breakthrough, and the additional investment 
required to produce it calculated as 25% of 
this revenue. The exercise price of the growth 
option is the present value of this investment: 
$189.52 million.
In the CD-ROA, mainly two factors determine 
success in this technological race: the amount 
of R&D each firm is willing to invest and 
the efficiency of such an investment. Average 
industry values for these parameters are provided 
by Kellogg, Charnes, Demirer (2002)13 where 
it is shown that, for the discovery phase, the 
average investment is $2.2 million, therefore, 
the average ratio of R&D / X equals .0116. 
Also, a value of b = ½ was suggested by Darby, 
Liu, Zucker, (1999), therefore the probability of 
discovery is =(R&D/X)½ = .1077 per year, 
meaning that the average time to discover a 
drug is around ten years14. 
13 They make assumptions based on previous work by Myers 
and Howe (1997), Office of Technology Assessment (1993), 
DiMasi et al. (1991), and Grabowski and Vernon (1994). 
14 Evidence showing that this is the average time required to 
discover a new drug is cited by Cochrane (2001), Schwartz 
(2002), and Kellogg, Charnes, Demirer (2002). 
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In order to compute the amount of R&D as a 
proportion of X for the firms participating in 
this race, I use the actual firm’s expenses on 
R&D in 199215. Table 2 shows the R&D / X ratio 
for each firm16. See Appendix A, Exhibits A7, 
A8.1, and A9 for the Consolidated Statement 
of Operations Data of Isis Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., Hybridon Inc., and AVI BioPharma Inc., 
respectively. 
Table 2
R&D Expenses
FIRM
R&D
(R&D expenses 
/ X)
Gilead Sciences Inc. 0.0720
Isis Pharmaceuticals Inc. 0.1261
Hybridon Inc. 0.0467
AVI BioPharma Inc. 0.0039
Total Challengers 0.1767
Clearly, the greater the amount of investment 
the expected monopolist is willing to make, 
relative to its challengers, the higher its 
probability of becoming the next monopolist. 
In this case, Gilead is investing more than 
Hybridon and AVI BioPharma combined, but 
less than Isis, giving this last firm an advantage 
in this race. 
The other determinant of which firm will win 
a technological race is the efficiency of its 
investment in research. Measuring efficiency 
is a difficult task in general, but even more 
for start-up firms which usually are on early 
stages of development of their products. They 
do not show profits, revenues are very low, and 
sometimes they do not even have any patents, 
15 The information the potential investor requires is the 
expected expenses on R&D next period by both the 
expected monopolist and its challenger. I use the actual 
value as a proxy for this value.
16 There is no public information for Gilead Sciences in 1992. 
R&D expenses on that year were calculated based on 1993 
data and adjusted to grow at the same average growth that 
this account showed in the following three years: 33.11%.  
as it is the case under analysis. However, 
two different ways to assess efficiency will be 
proposed next, keeping in mind that the subject 
calls for additional research.
The first methodology accounts for the number 
of patent applications filed up to the time of 
the IPO. It would be preferable to consider the 
patents approved since there is no guarantee 
that an application would become a patent. 
However, none of these firms had any patents 
approved at the time of this analysis. Before 
January 1992, Gilead and Isis had filed for 
ten applications each, Hybridon just for one, 
and AVI BioPharma had zero applications17. 
In the standard case, a b = ½ represents the 
average efficiency.18 On the other hand, there 
are reasons to argue that the real competitors 
in this race were Gilead and Isis only. AVI 
BioPharma investments in R&D were very low 
until 199719 and Hybridon was recently founded 
in 1990.  By January, 1992, only Gilead and Isis 
had expectations of filing an Investigational 
New Drug (IND) application20. According to 
this argument, and based on the number of 
patent applications filed by each company, both 
are equally efficient and b = ½ for both.
Another approach to measure the efficiency of 
R&D is computing the ratio of revenue to R&D 
expenses as it is shown in the next table21:
17  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). http://www.
uspto.gov. (June 27, 2003).
18 The standard case is when these firms invest the average 
amount of $2.2 million in R&D in the discovery phase.
19 See Exhibit 9.
20 Isis filed the first IND application for an antisense drug 
– ISIS2105- in January 30, 1992. (PR Newswire, January 
30, 1992). Gilead filed for GS504 in March, 1992 (Business 
Wire, March 19, 1992) and for GS393 in September, same 
year (Business Wire, September 23rd, 1992).
21 This ratio is the Average revenue / Average R&D for the 
period 1993-1996 when public information is available for 
Gilead, Isis, and Hybridon. For AVI BioPharma, the ratio 
is computed as the average for the period 1995-1996 since 
public information is available only after 1995. 
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Table 3
Revenue to R&D Expenses Ratio
FIRM Gilead Isis Hybridon
AVI Bio
Pharma
Revenue/R&D 0.40 0.54 0.07 0.03
Efficiency in terms of this ratio gives another 
argument to support that although apparently 
there were four firms competing in this race, 
the real competition was between Gilead and 
Isis since the ratio for Hybridon and AVI 
BioPharma is close to zero. Based on the ratio 
shown above for Gilead and Isis, it is clear that 
Isis’ research was more efficient. If a Revenue 
/ R&D ratio of ½ is taken as the average22, 
Gilead will be 20% less efficient and Isis 8% 
more efficient than the average case, therefore 
b (Gilead) =  0.55 with m = 0.086 and b (Isis) 
= 0.482  with c = 0.116. 
As for the other determinants of value, the drift 
rate for S is r, the risk-free rate.  The interest 
rate on the 10-year Federal bond was 7.03% in 
January, 1992. This approach also requires data 
on the distribution of the size of the jump, J, 
where ln J ~  (µ, ). As a proxy for µ and 
 I take the mean and standard deviation of 
the NBI in a period of ten years starting in 
November 1st, 1993, when µ = 12.77% and  
= 35.74%. 
Finally, for the scrap value, I assume 80%, 
meaning that when another company preempts 
the monopolist, this last one may still get some 
value by selling its assets and recovering at least 
80% of their value at that time23.
22 This ratio was 0.51 for Isis Pharmaceuticals in the 
period 1990-1992 (Exhibit 7) and 0.49 for Agouron 
Pharmaceuticals in the same period (Exhibit 5B). There is 
no information for Gilead in this period.  
23 In this case, the assets are mainly equipment with the 
newest technology, therefore, an assumption of an 80% 
scrap value would be appropriate.
3. Simulation and results
In order to value Gilead, I use the Monte 
Carlo method. According to (2), the stochastic 
process ln S follows is:
d1nS = (1nJ)dq + (1nY)d (5)
This process can be approximated by:
  
 
(6)
Using Monte Carlo, n paths of asset prices are 
simulated as follows:
  
 
(7)
where Z is a normal random variable. Dummym 
is one when there is a jump J and zero otherwise. 
The probability of a jump J in a period of time 
dt is m dt. Then, Dummym will be one when 
the value of a simulated uniformly distributed 
random number is less than or equal to m dt 
and zero otherwise. µ and  are the mean and 
standard deviation of this jump J, a process that 
is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution. 
On the other hand, the probability of a jump Y 
is c dt. Dummyc is one when there is a jump 
Y and zero, otherwise, and it may be simulated 
in a similar way to Dummym. Y is assumed 
constant. 
The n paths of S are simulated up to a time 
period T which covers the average time for 
a “drastic innovation” to take place in the 
industry. Whenever a Dummym equals one is 
found on each path, the asset price jumps. At 
that time, t, the firm decides to exercise the 
option depending on the size of the jump and 
the corresponding value reached by S(t). If this 
value is greater than the value of the exercise 
price (X) as defined above, the firm exercises 
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the option, and the option payoff is discounted 
at the risk-free interest rate. If the challenger 
innovates first or none of them innovate, the 
payoff from the option on that path is zero. The 
expected value of the growth option, G, will 
be the average of the present value of all these 
payoffs. The final value of the firm will be the 
sum of the project’s value without flexibility – S 
(t=0) – plus the value of the growth option G 
(t=0).
Two different cases are analyzed in order to 
value Gilead. Exhibit 10 shows the parameter 
values used to simulate each case. If the race 
is defined between Gilead and Isis only, they 
are equally efficient in terms of the number of 
patent applications, but Isis is investing more 
in research. In this case, the value of Gilead 
should have been around $286.26 millions. The 
other case measures R&D efficiency on the 
basis of the ratio of Revenue / R&D. Isis is more 
efficient and it also invests more than Gilead, 
resulting in a much lower value for Gilead of 
$289.58 millions. 
Gilead’s investors actually paid $20.25 for its 
shares in its IPO, which is 35% higher than 
the offer price and translates into a market 
value of $289.6 millions, close to the previous 
two estimations24. Both methodologies used 
to measure efficiency give approximately the 
same estimation; however, this subject requires 
further research. 
Based on the findings presented above, I 
conclude that the CD-ROA is able to explain 
the apparently high price paid by investors at 
this IPO which made an investment banker 
exclaim that “deals have started trading on 
best-case scenarios”. This approach shows 
that the success of Gilead’s IPO is not due 
to overpricing but recognition of the value 
added by two facts not being considered by the 
traditional valuation method, the passive NPV 
approach. Those facts are, on one hand, that 
this firm is under a creative destruction process, 
which gives it an expectation of becoming the 
next monopolist, and, on the other hand, it 
has a growth option which gives it flexibility to 
make additional investments only in the case 
of success. 
This approach also accounts properly for the 
probability of preemption by any competitor, in 
addition to other determinants of the value such 
as the characteristics of the industry which gives 
the distribution of the jump size, and the scrap 
value in case of preemption. Hence, all cases, 
not only best-case scenarios, are considered to 
estimate the value of this firm.
Furthermore, history will prove Gilead’s 
investors were right. In April, 2001, this firm 
applied for an FDA approval for its antisense 
drug Viread, after successful clinical trials 
proving that it is effective against HIV/AIDS. 
The approval came in December that year. 
Later, in 2002, the EU approved its sale in 
Europe as well. Annual revenues from this drug 
are estimated around $500 millions for 2003. 
Gilead’s stock price has soared since its IPO 
from $20.25 to $225.5625 in 2003, as can be 
seen in the following Figure.
24 These estimations have a 95% confidence level. The 
estimation errors are reported in Appendix A Exhibit 10.
25 This price was adjusted for splits. One share of Gilead in 
1992 is equivalent to four shares in 2003.
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Figure 2 
Gilead Sciences Share Price
NDA:   New Drug Application      sNDA: Supplemental New Drug Application
MHW: Japanesse Ministry for Health and Welfare
As for the defeated companies, they had the 
choice to participate in a new technological race 
to discover another “drastic innovation” or leave 
the market. In the case of Gilead’s challenger, 
Isis, considered the “Microsoft of biotechnology” 
in the nineties, it has concentrated all its efforts 
in a drug to fight cancer called Affinitak; 
however, news announcing that clinical trials 
have failed made the stock price fall in 2003. 
Some other relevant news and its effect on the 
Isis’ stock price are shown in Figure 3:
Figure 3
Isis Pharmaceuticals Stock Price
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The other two firms which started in the 
same race, AVI BioPharma and Hybridon, 
only managed to become public by 1997 and 
1998, respectively. Although AVI BioPharma, 
founded as AntiVirals Inc, was the oldest of all 
antisense firms, after more than twenty years, 
its research has produced poor results with 
only four patents by 2003, compared to 554 
of Isis and 106 of Gilead. In 1997, its founder, 
Dr. Summerton, was forced to resign as CEO 
and a new management came in, licensed new 
technologies, and now it has completed Phase 
II for Resten-NG, an antisense drug against 
Restenosis26 as well as for Avicine, a therapeutic 
cancer vaccine27. 
The fourth firm, Hybridon, is using another three 
technologies additional to antisense: Synthetic 
DNA, Cyclicon, and Immunomodulatory 
Oligonucleotide compounds. Their recent 
results are based on this last technology and 
are mainly focused on cancer. In conclusion, 
as it is predicted by the CD-ROA, all three 
of Gilead’s challengers have decided to move 
on to new technological races, either by using 
new technologies different from antisense or 
by aiming to discover different kinds of drugs, 
- mainly drugs to fight cancer. 
Conclusions
In general, the value of biotech companies 
appears to be overpriced only in terms of 
traditional valuation methods such as the 
passive NPV approach which fails to account for 
drivers of value in highly innovative industries 
such as a growth option these companies may 
exercise in case of success innovating and the 
expectation of monopolistic market power if 
the innovation is drastic in the way described 
by the Creative Destruction - Real Options 
Approach.
In this paper I apply the CD-ROA to the 
valuation of Gilead Sciences Inc., considering 
two different cases depending on the way 
efficiency of its research is measured. Results 
show that the value of Gilead should have been 
between $286-289 millions. Gilead’s investors 
paid 35% more than the offer price, a market 
value of $289.6 millions, close to the previous 
two estimations28. Both methodologies used 
to measure efficiency give approximately the 
same estimation; however, this subject requires 
further research. 
Based on the findings presented above, I 
conclude that the CD-ROA is able to explain 
the apparently high price paid by investors at 
this IPO which made an investment banker 
exclaim that “deals have started trading on best-
case scenarios”. This approach shows that the 
success of Gilead’s IPO is not due to overpricing 
but to recognition of the value added by two 
facts not being considered by the traditional 
valuation method, the passive NPV approach. 
Those facts are, on one hand, that this firm 
is under a creative destruction process, which 
gives it an expectation of becoming the next 
monopolist, and, on the other hand, it has a 
growth option which gives it flexibility to make 
additional investments only in case of success. 
This approach also accounts properly for the 
probability of preemption by any competitor, in 
addition to other determinants of the value such 
as the characteristics of the industry which gives 
the distribution of the jump size, and the scrap 
value in case of preemption. Hence, all cases, 
not only best-case scenarios, are considered to 
estimate the value of this firm.
26 Restenosis occurs when the arteries opened up by 
angioplasty become blocked again. Like cancer, restenosis 
involves abnormal cell division (The Register Guard, 
2001).
27 AVI BioPharma, 10k Report, 2002.
28 These estimations have a 95% confidence level. The 
estimation errors are reported in Appendix A Exhibit 10.
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EXHIBIT 2
GILEAD SCIENCES Inc.
Date Amount raised
Value of Gilead at 
that time
Investors   
Shares sold 
(millions)
Share value
Jun-87 $ 6.100 - Founders
Ago-87 $200.000 $ 810.000 Menlo Ventures 0.7 0.300
Ago-88 $600.000 $3.030.000 Menlo Ventures 0.7 0.900
Dic-87 $1.200.000 $10.260.000 Menlo Ventures 0.4 2.700
Oct-88 $10.000.000 $24.250.000 JH Whitney 2.7 3.750
Ago-90 $ 8.010.000 $66.600.000 Glaxo Holdings 0.9 9.000
Sep-91 $20.150.000 $ 97.700.000 JH Whitney 1.9 10.500
Ene-92 $75.000.000 $214.500.000 Public offering 5.0 15.000
Source:  Recombinant Capital Inc.
Biotech IPOs Ignite Buying Frenzy 
Two Bay Area firms see their stocks soar The San Francisco Chronicle
January 23, 1992
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EXHIBIT 3.1
GILEAD SCIENCES INC 1
(Before business combination with NeXstar Pharmaceuticals)
BALANCE SHEET 
(Dollars in thousands) 
 BALANCE SHEET 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 ASSETS 
Current assets: 
Cash and cash equivalents        27.420 131.984 31.990 32.475
Short-term               139.353 114.968 128.239 163.979 290.308 247.464
marketable securities           
Accounts receivable
Inventories
Other current assets                  1.558 4.290 17.960 8.371
Prepaid expenses and other 
Total current assets                157.217 300.253 340.258 288.310
   
 Property and equipment, net          8.369 9.172 10.313 10.182
Other noncurrent assets  1.073 1.248 1.498 4.368
 Total                             146.809 126.602 166.659 310.673 352.069 302.860
   
 LIABILITIES AND 
STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY 
 Current liabilities: 
 Accounts payable                 2.412 2.501 3.303 3.422
 Accrued liabilities                   6.152 9.440 18.694 24.283
 Deferred revenue                     208 527 9.541 3.275
 Current portion of capital 
Long-term obligations due within one year 2.906 3.631 1.853 770
 Total current liabilities             11.678 16.099 33.391 31.750
Long term liabilities:
Long-term deferred revenue 
Long-term obligations due after one year 1.156 2.479 3.482 2.914 1.331 563
Accrued rent
Convertible senior debt         
Convertible subordinated debt   
Total long term liabilities 3.482 2.914 1.331 563
Stockholders’ equity: 
Preferred stock, par value per share 1 1
Common stock, par value per share 24 29 30 31
Additional paid-in capital       265.460 426.577 479.737 489.183
Accumulated other comprehensive income(loss) 167 89 344 43
Accumulated deficit -28.353 -54.065 -112.754 -134.486 -162.479 -218.554
Deferred compensation                          -1.398 -549 -286 -157
Total stockholders’ equity          139.402 115.280 151.499 291.660 317.347 270.547
 Total                            166.659 310.673 352.069 302.860
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EXHIBIT 3.1
Notes
*In 1995 fiscal year changes from March 31st to December 31st. In Years  1993-1996
fiscal year ended in March 31st.
On July 29, 1999, The company entered into a business combination with NeXstar
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“NeXstar”). The business combination has been accounted 
for as a pooling of interests and our historical consolidated financial statements for 
all years prior to the business combination have been restated in the accompanying 
consolidated financial statements to include the financial position, results of operations 
and cash flows of NeXstar.
Pooling of interests method is used in limited situations in which shares of stock in the 
two companies are exchanged.
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GILEAD SCIENCES INC 2
(After business combination with NeXtar Pharmaceuticals)
BALANCE SHEET 
(Dollars in thousands) 
BALANCE SHEET 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ASSETS
Current assets: 
Cash and cash equivalents        101.136 47.011 197.292 123.490 616.931
Short-term               
Marketable securities               247.607 247.383 315.586 459.361 325.443
Accounts receivable 74.228 125.036
Inventories 16.550 20.959 20.562 39.280 51.628
Other current assets                  43.090 45.599 48.814 50.000
Prepaid expenses and other 8.506 11.029 11.544 11.400 14.722
Total current assets                416.889 371.981 593.798 707.759 1.183.760
Property and equipment, net    51.019 51.398 55.174 62.828 67.727
Other noncurrent assets  19.856 13.429 29.127 24.199 36.696
Total                             275.376 450.540 516.989 487.764 436.808 678.099 794.786 1.288.183
   
LIABILITIES AND 
STOCKHOLDERS’ 
EQUITY 
Current liabilities: 
Accounts payable                 7.662 9.481 11.605 19.174 24.406
Accrued liabilities                   41.555 30.372 39.244 55.455 72.600
Deferred revenue                     3.275 4.833 4.355 3.996 7.692
Current portion of capital 
Long-term obligations due 
w/in one yr 4.842 3.191 3.034 1.492 194
Total current liabilities             57.334 47.877 58.238 80.117 104.892
Long term liabilities:
Long-term deferred revenue 10.730 7.252 16.677
Long-term obligations due 
after one year 13.330 18.120 9.658 8.883 5.253 2.238 389 273
Accrued rent 7.848 6.853 5.769 4.591
Convertible senior debt         345.000
Convertible subordinated debt  80.000 79.533 250.000 250.000 250.000
Total long term liabilities 96.731 91.639 268.737 262.232 611.950
Stockholders’ equity: 
Preferred stock, par value per 
share
1
Common stock, par value per 
share 42 44 189 193 198
Additional paid-in capital       716.964 749.081 857.847 898.533 950.308
Accumulated other 
comprehensive income(loss)
-337 -2.527 -901 7.448 2.475
Accumulated deficit -382.746 -449.232 -506.008 -453.737 -381.640
Deferred compensation      -    (3) -225 -74 -3
Total stockholders’ equity          228.931 374.649 357.726 333.699 297.292 351.124 452.437 571.341
 Total                            487.764 436.808 678.099 794.786 1.288.183
EXHIBIT 3.2
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EXHIBIT 3.2
Notes
*In 1995 fiscal year changes from March 31st to December 31st. In Years  1993-1996 
fiscal year ended in March 31st.
On July 29, 1999, The company entered into a business combination with NeXstar 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“NeXstar”). The business combination has been accounted 
for as a pooling of interests and our historical consolidated financial statements for 
all years prior to the business combination have been restated in the accompanying 
consolidated financial statements to include the financial position, results of 
operations and cash flows of NeXstar.
Pooling of interests method is used in limited situations in which shares of stock in 
the two companies are exchanged.
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
28
E
X
H
IB
IT
 4
.1
G
IL
E
A
D
 S
C
IE
N
C
E
S 
IN
C
 1
(B
ef
or
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 c
om
bi
na
ti
on
 w
it
h 
N
eX
st
ar
 P
ha
rm
ac
eu
ti
ca
ls
)
C
O
N
SO
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F 
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
D
A
T
A
 
(i
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s,
 e
xc
ep
t 
pe
r 
sh
ar
e 
da
ta
) 
   
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
R
ev
en
ue
s:
 
Pr
od
uc
t 
sa
le
s,
 n
et
0
0
0
84
77
11
73
5
60
74
C
on
tr
ac
t 
re
ve
nu
es
 a
nd
 r
oy
al
ti
es
41
77
40
85
49
22
24
94
3
28
30
2
26
49
6
To
ta
l r
ev
en
ue
s
41
77
40
85
49
22
33
42
0
40
03
7
32
57
0
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s:
 
C
os
t 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 s
al
es
0
0
0
91
0
11
67
59
4
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
17
98
7
26
04
6
30
36
0
41
88
1
59
16
2
75
29
8
Se
lli
ng
, g
en
er
al
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
43
77
76
39
96
69
26
69
2
25
47
2
31
00
3
To
ta
l o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 c
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s
22
36
4
33
68
5
40
02
9
69
48
3
85
80
1
10
68
95
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
In
co
m
e 
(L
os
s)
 fr
om
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
s
(1
81
87
)
(2
96
00
)
(3
51
07
)
(3
60
63
)
(4
57
64
0
(7
43
25
)
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e,
 n
et
41
05
38
88
38
33
15
04
2
18
26
0
18
44
2
N
et
 in
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
(1
40
82
)
(2
57
12
)
(3
12
74
)
(2
17
32
)
(2
79
93
)
(5
60
75
)
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
B
as
ic
 a
nd
 d
ilu
te
d 
In
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
 p
er
 s
ha
re
(0
,8
8)
(1
,3
7)
(1
,6
5)
(0
,7
8)
(0
,9
5)
(1
,8
5)
C
om
m
on
 s
ha
re
s 
us
ed
 in
 t
he
 c
al
cu
la
ti
on
 o
f b
as
ic
 a
nd
 
16
06
5
18
77
9
18
97
1
27
78
6
29
32
6
30
36
3
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
29
E
X
H
IB
IT
 4
.2
G
IL
E
A
D
 S
C
IE
N
C
E
S 
IN
C
 2
(A
ft
er
 b
us
in
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
ti
on
 w
it
h 
N
eX
ta
r 
P
ha
rm
ac
eu
ti
ca
ls
)
C
O
N
SO
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F
 O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
D
A
T
A
 
 (
In
 t
ho
us
an
ds
, e
xc
ep
t 
pe
r 
sh
ar
e 
da
ta
) 
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
R
ev
en
ue
s:
 
P
ro
du
ct
 s
al
es
, n
et
10
08
87
11
41
76
13
98
90
14
97
09
19
09
70
42
38
79
C
on
tr
ac
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
an
d 
ro
ya
lt
ie
s
31
37
1
36
94
3
29
08
9
45
84
6
42
79
9
42
91
1
T
ot
al
 r
ev
en
ue
s
13
22
58
15
11
19
16
89
79
19
55
55
23
37
69
46
67
90
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s:
 
C
os
t o
f 
pr
od
uc
t s
al
es
21
64
6
23
35
7
29
54
6
33
51
2
43
76
4
69
72
4
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
11
21
77
12
77
73
11
28
88
13
23
39
18
55
53
13
47
58
S
el
li
ng
, g
en
er
al
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
70
62
6
78
23
4
78
34
7
82
02
2
12
51
41
18
13
01
T
ot
al
 o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 c
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s
22
04
80
23
06
31
23
98
38
24
78
73
35
44
58
38
57
83
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
In
co
m
e 
(L
os
s)
 f
ro
m
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
s
(8
82
22
)
(7
95
12
)
(7
08
59
)
(5
23
18
)
(1
20
68
9)
81
00
7
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e,
 n
et
20
70
6
21
76
5
16
43
5
17
63
4
25
59
1
22
29
1
N
et
 in
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
(7
28
93
)
(4
47
58
)
(6
64
86
)
(5
67
76
)
52
27
1
72
09
7
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
B
as
ic
 a
nd
 d
ilu
te
d 
In
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
 p
er
 s
ha
re
(1
,8
5)
(1
,0
9)
(1
,5
5)
(0
,3
1)
0,
28
0,
37
C
om
m
on
 s
ha
re
s 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
of
 b
as
ic
 
an
d 
39
43
2
41
01
5
42
82
6
18
20
99
19
02
45
19
55
43
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
30
A
G
O
U
R
O
N
 P
H
A
R
M
A
C
E
U
T
IC
A
L
S,
 I
N
C
. 
    B
A
L
A
N
C
E
 S
H
E
E
T
 (
00
0s
)
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
 A
SS
E
T
S 
 C
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s:
 
 C
as
h 
an
d 
ca
sh
 e
qu
iv
al
en
ts
   
   
  
79
84
81
35
11
46
0
59
66
77
83
21
04
43
58
16
45
1
52
48
4
19
09
8
 S
ho
rt
-t
er
m
   
   
   
   
   
90
89
1,
00
1
33
79
5
29
61
7
27
75
7
15
88
6
74
42
4
38
83
3
68
02
5
 A
cc
ou
nt
s 
re
ce
iv
ab
le
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
47
1
36
6
16
1
22
8
34
2
32
8
34
4
29
66
31
97
5
51
34
1
 I
nv
en
to
ri
es
58
80
0
10
37
06
 O
th
er
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s 
   
   
   
   
   
  
74
14
6
22
9
18
4
24
2
89
1
87
1
18
00
22
09
52
47
    T
ot
al
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s 
   
   
   
   
   
85
29
17
73
6
12
85
1
40
17
3
35
28
4
31
08
0
21
45
9
95
64
1
18
42
01
24
79
81
    P
ro
pe
rt
y 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t,
 n
et
     
     
27
49
31
28
28
21
54
52
64
37
60
98
56
38
69
36
22
61
3
47
21
2
 T
ot
al
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
92
65
29
81
23
11
27
8
20
86
4
15
67
2
45
62
5
41
72
1
37
17
8
27
09
7
10
25
77
26
69
14
36
33
37
   
   
 L
IA
B
IL
IT
IE
S 
A
N
D
 
 S
T
O
C
K
H
O
L
D
E
R
S’
 E
Q
U
IT
Y
 
C
ur
re
nt
 li
ab
il
it
ie
s:
 
A
cc
ou
nt
s 
pa
ya
bl
e 
   
   
   
   
   
 
60
4
46
9
57
4
86
8
12
87
15
14
54
26
66
59
28
83
3
44
39
3
A
cc
ru
ed
 li
ab
il
it
ie
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
14
0
32
6
36
4
30
3
38
0
51
9
68
3
43
27
88
89
35
35
6
D
ef
er
re
d 
re
ve
nu
e 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
97
3
14
44
24
03
30
05
28
26
68
18
57
45
13
78
8
27
56
7
23
56
3
C
ur
re
nt
 p
or
ti
on
 o
f 
ca
pi
ta
l 
53
2
88
2
85
8
11
90
76
8
48
6
25
26
15
80
2
L
ea
se
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
96
5
58
4
   
To
ta
l c
ur
re
nt
 li
ab
il
it
ie
s 
   
   
   
   
26
82
28
23
38
73
50
58
53
51
10
04
1
12
62
2
25
26
0
68
41
5
12
02
53
L
on
g 
te
rm
 li
ab
il
it
ie
s:
C
ap
it
al
 le
as
es
, l
es
s 
C
ur
re
nt
 p
or
ti
on
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
40
0
11
41
11
79
21
26
13
51
99
2
58
0
50
1
59
40
58
92
A
cc
ru
ed
 r
en
t
12
33
12
77
16
23
To
ta
l l
on
g 
te
rm
 li
ab
il
it
ie
s
17
34
72
17
69
15
St
oc
kh
ol
de
rs
’ e
qu
it
y:
 
   
P
re
fe
rr
ed
 s
to
ck
65
51
65
51
32
78
0
68
80
9
C
om
m
on
 s
to
ck
   
A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 d
efi
ci
t  
   
   
   
   
  
91
28
15
35
2
22
16
0
31
29
2
(4
11
21
)
(5
05
83
)
(6
35
22
)
(8
30
45
)
(1
25
85
1)
(1
12
69
7)
To
ta
l s
to
ck
ho
ld
er
s’
 e
qu
it
y 
   
   
   
23
62
82
63
37
81
96
16
90
0
10
62
0
37
51
7
33
75
7
24
85
2
12
59
1
75
58
3
19
12
82
23
61
69
 T
ot
al
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
11
27
8
20
86
4
15
67
2
45
62
5
41
72
1
37
17
8
27
09
7
10
25
77
26
69
14
36
33
77
E
X
H
IB
IT
 5
.1
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
31
E
X
H
IB
IT
 5
.2
A
G
O
U
R
O
N
 P
H
A
R
M
A
C
E
U
T
IC
A
L
S
C
O
N
SO
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F 
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
D
A
T
A
 
 (
in
 t
ho
us
an
ds
, e
xc
ep
t 
pe
r 
sh
ar
e 
da
ta
) 
     
 
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
R
ev
en
ue
s:
 
Pr
od
uc
t 
sa
le
s,
 n
et
56
96
9
40
92
98
C
on
tr
ac
t 
re
ve
nu
es
 a
nd
 
ro
ya
lt
ie
s
89
2
18
29
20
75
37
81
53
07
82
66
16
30
1
26
72
2
40
95
5
65
09
4
38
85
5
In
te
re
st
37
3
74
0
12
74
10
14
15
40
17
04
13
50
12
39
Li
ce
ns
e 
fe
es
15
00
0
10
00
0
18
35
2
 T
ot
al
 r
ev
en
ue
s
32
2,
3
53
6
12
65
25
69
33
49
47
95
68
47
99
70
17
65
1
27
96
1
55
95
5
13
20
63
46
65
05
 C
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s:
 
 C
os
t 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 s
al
es
24
59
9
17
26
44
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
35
18
61
90
80
35
93
53
13
14
2
17
40
4
23
95
7
36
31
7
71
01
0
10
81
37
15
06
57
Se
lli
ng
, g
en
er
al
 a
nd
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
65
7
91
2
13
84
18
80
25
19
21
27
29
61
43
58
80
82
32
94
1
58
01
2
In
te
re
st
12
6
18
6
15
4
18
3
31
8
26
8
19
5
22
5
To
ta
l o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 c
os
ts
 a
nd
 
ex
pe
ns
es
43
01
72
88
95
73
11
41
6
15
97
9
19
79
9
27
11
3
40
90
0
79
09
2
22
31
77
44
97
36
 L
os
s 
fr
om
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
s
 I
nt
er
es
t 
in
co
m
e,
 n
et
 N
et
 lo
ss
(1
62
)
(7
73
,1
)
(3
03
6)
(4
71
9)
(6
22
4)
(6
62
1)
(9
13
2)
(9
82
9)
(9
46
2)
(1
29
39
)
(1
95
23
)
(4
28
06
)
13
15
4
B
as
ic
 a
nd
 d
ilu
te
d 
lo
ss
 p
er
 
sh
ar
e
0,
1
0,
42
1,
24
1,
77
1,
77
1,
42
1,
47
1,
4
1,
31
1,
77
1,
98
3,
18
(0
,4
3)
 C
om
m
on
 s
ha
re
s 
us
ed
 in
 t
he
 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
of
 b
as
ic
 a
nd
 
16
66
18
51
24
56
26
60
37
39
46
74
61
99
69
97
72
41
72
96
98
44
13
47
3
 (
1)
 I
n 
O
ct
ob
er
 1
99
5,
 th
e 
C
om
pa
ny
 c
ha
ng
ed
 it
s 
fis
ca
l y
ea
r 
en
d 
fr
om
 M
ar
ch
 3
1 
to
 
   
   
 D
ec
em
be
r 
31
, e
ff
ec
ti
ve
 w
it
h 
th
e 
ni
ne
 m
on
th
s 
en
de
d 
D
ec
em
be
r 
31
, 1
99
5.
 
    (
2)
 N
o 
di
vi
de
nd
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
de
cl
ar
ed
 o
r 
pa
id
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
m
on
 s
to
ck
. 
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
32
E
X
H
IB
IT
 6
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 P
ro
du
ce
 a
 B
re
ak
th
ro
ug
h 
D
ru
g
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t i
n 
Pl
an
t, 
E
qu
ip
m
en
t, 
an
d 
W
or
ki
ng
 C
ap
ita
l)
Y
E
A
R
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
B
R
E
A
K
T
H
R
O
U
G
H
 R
E
V
E
N
U
E
*
27
5
27
5
27
5
27
5
77
5
77
5
77
5
13
24
13
24
13
24
13
24
13
24
13
24
IN
V
E
ST
M
E
N
T
S 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
68
,7
5
0
0
0
12
5
0
0
13
7,
3
0
0
0
0
0
P
V
 (
IN
V
E
ST
M
E
N
T
S)
(m
ill
io
ns
)
$1
89
,5
2 
* 
M
ye
rs
 a
nd
 H
ow
e 
(1
99
7)
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
33
E
X
H
IB
IT
 7
IS
IS
 P
H
A
R
M
A
C
E
U
T
IC
A
L
S
C
O
N
SO
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F 
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
D
A
T
A
 
(I
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s,
 e
xc
ep
t 
pe
r 
sh
ar
e 
da
ta
) 
   
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
R
ev
en
ue
s:
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
re
ve
nu
es
 u
nd
er
    
co
lia
bo
ra
ti
ve
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 
18
26
62
61
87
27
10
65
4
10
08
8
12
96
6
22
57
2
32
47
0
34
13
0
29
35
7
16
91
2
40
39
8
67
82
0
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
re
ve
nu
es
 fr
om
 
af
ili
at
es
 
44
02
79
67
10
56
1
11
94
2
G
ai
n 
on
 s
al
e 
of
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
31
74
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e
13
2
17
82
20
89
14
86
22
51
30
01
40
12
40
67
Li
ce
ns
in
g 
an
d 
ro
ya
lt
y 
re
ve
nu
es
   
 
50
41
16
6
12
37
6
23
16
41
7
To
ta
l r
ev
en
ue
s
19
58
80
43
10
81
6
12
14
0
15
51
3
15
96
7
26
58
4
36
53
7
39
17
1
33
92
5
37
25
5
53
27
5
80
17
9
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s:
 
C
os
t 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 s
al
es
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
47
55
12
38
1
23
66
9
25
60
4
26
46
8
33
17
5
45
65
3
55
94
0
62
20
0
66
41
3
57
01
4
83
74
1
1E
+
05
Se
lli
ng
, g
en
er
al
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
16
89
43
99
66
57
48
09
59
81
54
02
62
46
80
78
95
11
10
57
1
86
44
11
06
1
85
47
In
te
re
st
 e
xp
en
se
78
9
12
45
11
02
12
06
35
85
To
ta
l o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 c
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s
64
44
16
78
0
30
32
6
31
20
2
33
69
4
39
67
9
53
10
5
67
60
3
76
94
9
76
98
4
67
88
0
99
37
5
1E
+
05
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
In
co
m
e 
(L
os
s)
 fr
om
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
s
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e,
 n
et
N
et
 in
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
- 
44
86
- 
87
37
- 1
95
10
- 1
90
62
- 1
81
81
- 2
37
12
- 2
65
21
- 3
10
66
- 4
29
83
- 5
96
45
- 5
34
85
- 4
61
00
- 5
08
13
B
as
ic
 a
nd
 d
ilu
te
d 
In
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
 p
er
 s
ha
re
0,
70
0,
84
1,
51
1,
22
0,
93
1,
10
1,
04
1,
17
1,
6
2,
08
1,
48
1,
7
1,
35
C
om
m
on
 s
ha
re
s 
us
ed
 in
 t
he
 c
al
cu
la
ti
on
 o
f 
ba
si
c 
64
51
10
35
5
12
89
2
15
68
5
19
54
2
21
51
4
25
58
5
26
45
6
26
87
3
28
70
3
37
02
3
44
10
9
54
48
0
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
34
E
X
H
IB
IT
 8
.1
H
Y
B
R
ID
O
N
 1
(B
ef
or
e 
th
e 
sa
le
 o
f H
SP
*)
C
O
N
SO
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F 
O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
D
A
T
A
 
(I
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s,
 e
xc
ep
t 
pe
r 
sh
ar
e 
da
ta
) 
   
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
R
ev
en
ue
s:
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
   
   
 
91
7
10
32
11
86
14
19
94
5
11
00
60
0
Pr
od
uc
t 
re
ve
nu
e 
 
10
80
18
77
32
54
61
86
C
on
tr
ac
t 
re
ve
nu
es
 a
nd
 r
oy
al
ti
es
62
48
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e
12
26
7
13
5
21
9
14
47
10
79
14
8
21
5
To
ta
l r
ev
en
ue
s
12
11
84
11
67
14
05
40
08
39
49
45
02
70
01
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s:
 
C
os
t 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 s
al
es
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
87
62
16
16
8
20
02
4
29
68
5
39
39
0
46
82
8
20
97
7
13
09
0
 S
el
lin
g,
 g
en
er
al
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
51
63
43
72
66
78
60
94
11
34
7
11
02
7
65
73
36
64
 I
nt
er
es
t
78
2
38
0
69
17
3
12
4
45
36
29
32
75
0
 R
ee
st
ru
cu
tu
ri
ng
11
02
0
 T
ot
al
 o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 c
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s
14
70
7
20
92
0
26
77
1
35
95
2
50
86
1
73
41
1
30
48
2
17
50
4
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 I
nc
om
e 
(L
os
s)
 fr
om
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
s
-1
46
95
-1
97
36
-2
56
04
-3
45
47
-4
68
53
-6
94
62
-2
59
80
-1
05
03
G
ai
n 
on
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
of
 9
%
 c
on
ve
rt
ib
le
   
  
su
bo
rd
in
at
ed
 n
ot
es
 p
ay
ab
le
88
77
,0
0
 I
nt
er
es
t 
in
co
m
e,
 n
et
 N
et
 in
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
-1
46
95
-1
97
36
-2
56
04
-3
45
47
-4
68
53
- 
69
46
2
-1
71
03
-1
05
03
 B
as
ic
 a
nd
 d
ilu
te
d 
In
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
 p
er
 s
ha
re
2,
13
(1
,9
3)
(1
3,
76
)
(1
,6
7)
(0
,9
3)
 C
om
m
on
 s
ha
re
s 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
16
19
5
24
26
1
50
50
11
85
9
15
81
1
*I
n 
S
ep
te
m
be
r 
21
, 2
00
0,
 H
yb
ri
do
n 
so
ld
 it
s 
H
yb
ri
do
n 
S
pe
ci
al
ty
 P
ro
du
ct
s 
or
 “
H
S
P
” 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
nd
 a
ss
et
s
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
35
E
X
H
IB
IT
 8
.2
H
Y
B
R
ID
O
N
 2
(A
ft
er
 th
e 
sa
le
 o
f 
H
S
P
)
C
O
N
SO
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F
 O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
D
A
T
A
 
(I
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s,
 e
xc
ep
t 
pe
r 
sh
ar
e 
da
ta
) 
   
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
R
ev
en
ue
s:
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t  
   
   
14
19
94
5
11
00
60
0
17
9
98
8
29
55
0
S
er
vi
ce
 r
ev
en
ue
  
37
5
36
5
82
C
on
tr
ac
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
an
d 
ro
ya
lt
ie
s
62
12
3
22
9
57
7
66
0
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e
14
47
10
79
14
8
92
83
13
4
46
T
ot
al
 r
ev
en
ue
s
29
28
20
24
16
23
11
80
57
3
16
99
30
25
6
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s:
 
C
os
t o
f 
pr
od
uc
t s
al
es
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
33
15
0
35
32
6
14
18
3
57
83
36
20
48
68
78
77
S
el
li
ng
, g
en
er
al
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
11
34
7
11
02
7
65
73
36
64
31
84
50
51
70
54
In
te
re
st
34
42
78
28
20
68
3
21
54
13
19
15
0
R
ee
st
ru
cu
tu
ri
ng
10
34
5
T
ot
al
 o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 c
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s
44
53
1
60
97
6
23
57
6
10
13
0
89
58
13
00
0
13
78
4
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
In
co
m
e 
(L
os
s)
 f
ro
m
 d
is
co
nt
in
ue
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
-5
25
0
-1
05
09
-4
02
8
-1
55
3
54
62
26
63
G
ai
n 
on
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
of
 9
%
 c
on
ve
rt
ib
le
 s
ub
or
di
na
te
d 
no
te
s 
pa
ya
bl
e
88
77
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e,
 n
et
N
et
 in
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
-4
68
53
-6
94
61
-1
71
04
-1
05
03
-2
92
3
-5
33
3
16
97
2
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
36
E
X
H
IB
IT
 9
A
V
I 
B
IO
P
H
A
R
M
A
 I
nc
.
C
O
N
SO
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
M
E
N
T
 O
F
 O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
D
A
T
A
 
 (
In
 t
ho
us
an
ds
, e
xc
ep
t 
pe
r 
sh
ar
e 
da
ta
) 
   
19
91
*
19
92
*
19
93
*
19
94
*
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
R
ev
en
ue
s:
 
P
ro
du
ct
 s
al
es
, n
et
C
on
tr
ac
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
an
d 
ro
ya
lt
ie
s
T
ot
al
 r
ev
en
ue
s
83
28
14
12
0
17
1.
29
7
70
6
83
7
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
se
s:
 
C
os
t o
f 
pr
od
uc
t s
al
es
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
72
5
72
5
72
5
72
5
2.
09
8
1.
73
0
2.
73
7
6.
30
7
6.
67
2
9.
26
8
12
.7
51
22
.4
14
S
el
li
ng
, g
en
er
al
 a
nd
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
61
0
61
4
1.
28
2
1.
62
1
1.
74
5
2.
27
0
3.
35
8
3.
76
4
T
ot
al
 o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 c
os
ts
 a
nd
 
ex
pe
ns
es
72
5
72
5
72
5
72
5
2.
70
8
2.
34
4
4.
01
9
7.
92
8
8.
41
7
11
.5
38
16
.1
09
26
.1
78
A
cq
ui
re
d 
in
-p
ro
ce
ss
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
19
.4
73
72
In
co
m
e 
(L
os
s)
 f
ro
m
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
s
In
te
re
st
 in
co
m
e,
 n
et
1.
00
1
1.
00
1
46
0
N
et
 in
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
-2
.5
57
-2
.0
87
-3
.6
16
26
.7
34
-8
.2
78
-9
.2
40
-2
6.
92
5
-2
9.
35
9
B
as
ic
 a
nd
 d
ilu
te
d 
In
co
m
e 
(l
os
s)
 p
er
 s
ha
re
(0
,3
7)
(0
,2
5)
(0
,3
6)
(2
,2
7)
(0
,6
2)
(0
,4
9)
(1
,2
0)
(1
,1
4)
C
om
m
on
 s
ha
re
s 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
of
 b
as
ic
 a
nd
 
To
ta
l e
xp
en
se
s 
on
 R
&
D
 u
nt
il
 1
99
7:
9.
46
3.
29
7
So
ur
ce
: 
10
-K
 r
ep
or
t 1
99
8
To
ta
l e
xp
en
se
s 
on
 R
&
D
 u
nt
il
 1
99
5:
 2
,8
98
,7
75
*A
ve
ra
ge
 R
&
D
 f
or
 y
ea
rs
 1
99
1-
19
94
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
to
ta
l R
&
D
 a
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 u
nt
il
 1
99
5 
 
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
   
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
   
E
A
FI
T
 
M
ed
el
lín
  N
úm
er
o 
9 
 ju
l -
 d
ic
  2
00
6
37
EXHIBIT 10
CD-ROA SIMULATION
Parameter Values
CASE 1 CASE 2
FIRM VALUE 286,26 FIRM VALUE 289,58
(million dollars) (million dollars)
error 3,3371 error 3,6034
Parameter Value Parameter Value
path (n trials) 10000 path (n trials) 10000
n steps 40 n steps 40
S0 235,95 S0 235,95
X 187,52 X 187,52
r 7,03% r 7,03%
T 10 T 10
scrap % 0,8 scrap % 0,8
b (E. monopolist) 0,5 b (E. monopolist) 0,55
b (challenger) 0,5 b (challenger) 0,482
RD (E. monopolist) 0,0720 RD (E. monopolist) 0,0720
RD (challenger) 0,1261 RD (challenger) 0,1261
miu (J) 0,25 miu (J) 0,25
sigma (J) 0,37 sigma (J) 0,37
